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You’re on Native Land: The Genocide Convention,
Cultural Genocide, and Prevention of Indigenous
Land Takings
Bonnie St. Charles

Abstract
Genocide is a sensitive topic. While the Genocide Convention is traditionally understood,
especially in the popular imagination, to prohibit mass killings, its provisions prohibit a far
broader array of conduct. While killings of Indigenous peoples have thus frequently been
considered to fall within the bounds of the Genocide Convention, crimes against culture—like
the taking of ancestral or sacred Indigenous lands—have been considered outside of its bounds.
While many of these takings continue to occur today, Indigenous loss of land has been consistent
throughout history. This Comment argues that cultural genocide, both as a means and as an end,
are properly included within the terms of the Genocide Convention. This Comment further argues
that the doctrine of continuing violations, which allows tribunals to exercise jurisdiction over
failures to investigate and remediate violations of the Convention, including violations that
occurred before a state’s ratification of the Convention, may provide recourse for pre- and postConvention wrongs committed against Indigenous peoples.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
From the American Trail of Tears to the Amazonian wildfires set by
ranchers and miners in 2019, Indigenous peoples1 have consistently endured the
taking of their ancestral homelands, either by force or fraud. The U.N. addressed
this problem—purportedly, at least—in the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).2 The UNDRIP has fallen far short of its
potential, though, due to both the lack of a compelling enforcement mechanism
and non-adoption by key nations, such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand. Countries have struggled to develop a global consensus on the best
mechanism for the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, and Indigenous
groups continue to lose control and ownership of their territories as a result. This
type of harm is likely to continue without intervention in, and resolution of,
concerns about sovereignty and states’ potential legal exposure under international
law.
The word “genocide” has serious baggage, and for good reason. The word
conjures up images of the gas chambers and extermination camps of the
Holocaust and the bloody conflict and mass murders in Srebrenica. The
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide3 (hereinafter the “Genocide Convention” or “the Convention”),
however, has the potential—and, in certain cases, already has been used—to cover
far more, and far different, acts than those traditionally considered to be genocide.
While cultural genocide is typically considered outside the scope of the
Convention, this Comment argues that it, in fact, does fall within the bounds of
the Convention. Developments in the West indicate that a broader interpretation
of the Convention may be gaining support. For example, in Canada, a national
commission investigating the missing and murdered Indigenous women (MMIW)
crisis concluded that Canada had perpetrated, and continues to perpetrate,
genocide against Indigenous women and girls by failing to protect them from
cultural violence and discrimination.4 Furthermore, Article 2(b) of the
1

2
3

4

In this Comment, Indigenous peoples refers to tribal groups, while Indigenous people refers to the
individuals who form Indigenous peoples.
G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9. 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
Ian Austen & Dan Bilefsky, Canadian Inquiry Calls Killings of Indigenous Women Genocide, N. Y. TIMES
(June 3, 2019), http://perma.cc/4CWF-LB6X. Additionally, courts in the U.S. have been moving
towards a broader understanding of genocide. See, for example, Simon v. Hungary, 812 F.3d 127,
142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (dealing with the taking of Holocaust-era cultural property, noting that
[i]t is undisputed that genocide itself is a violation of international law. The
question then becomes whether the takings of property described in the
complaint bear a sufficient connection to genocide that they amount to takings
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Convention, which prohibits the infliction of serious physical or mental harm on
any group, is receiving renewed scholarly attention.5 Redress for Indigenous
cultural extermination and destruction, however, generally remains severely
limited by both overly-narrow readings of the Convention and a lack of political
willpower to protect Indigenous groups.
The Genocide Convention can be used to protect against forms of cultural
extermination, including the taking of Indigenous lands. The Convention’s text,
its broader purpose, and the expanding doctrine of continuing violations so
dictate. This Comment will begin in Section II by covering the history and purpose
of the Convention, as well as the historical interpretation and prosecution of
crimes under Article 2(b) and Article 2(e), which prevent forcible removal of
children from their families. Section III will then dive into an analysis of cultural
genocide, arguing that the plain text of the Convention as well as its intent and
purpose dictate that cultural genocide is prosecutable under Article 2. Section IV
will briefly explain the history of international Indigenous land conflicts and
identify ongoing issues in Indigenous territorial sovereignty and, further, the harm
that the taking of Indigenous lands inflicts. It additionally will argue that
Indigenous land takings may be a form of genocide, and that the doctrine of
continuing violations permits prosecuting takings before and after the ratification
of the Convention.

II. T HE C RIME OF G ENOCIDE
This Section traces the 1948 Genocide Convention’s history and discusses
Article 2 of the Convention to lay the groundwork for a later discussion of cultural
genocide.

A. Raphael Lemkin and the Birth of “Genocide”
In the post-World War II era, the Allied powers sought assurances that
history would not repeat itself.6 Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer from that
era, is considered the first to argue that genocide—a term he coined—should be
a crime under international law.7 Lemkin recognized the growing consensus that
minority groups deserved protection from majority groups; however, minority

5
6

7

‘in violation of international law.’ We hold that they do. In our view, the alleged
takings did more than effectuate genocide or serve as a means of carrying out
genocide. Rather, we see the expropriations as themselves genocide.
(internal citations omitted)).
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2(b).
Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years
Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L COMP. L. 415, 423 (1998).
Id.
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groups often lacked the capacity to protect themselves against existential assaults.8
Lemkin believed that the previous framework contained within the Hague Peace
Conventions of 1899 and 1907––the first international instruments concerning
war and disarmament9––was too weak to meaningfully protect these minority
groups.10 Working closely with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, then-President of the
U.S., Lemkin began forming the conceptual link between genocide and the
nascent conception of “crimes against humanity.”11
Lemkin’s conception of genocide was twofold. First, there needed to be the
destruction of the group, representing the negative action of genocide. The act is
negative in that it is destructive rather than constructive or reconstructive. Second,
there needed to be forced adoption of the majoritarian culture, a positive action.12
The Nuremburg Tribunal addressed genocide for the first time, although the
word genocide was mentioned only “in a single paragraph of the indictment,” and
the judgment itself made no mention of genocide.13 Ultimately, the Tribunal
determined that any crime against humanity—for example, genocide—must be
connected to a war crime in order to sustain an adverse judgment.14 The
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal was later extended to cover peacetime
extermination efforts in the Einsatzgruppen case, prosecuted by the U.S. under
Control Council Law No. 10 411.15 The Einsatzgruppen judgment codified crimes
against humanity and grounded them in the “principles of justice common to all
civilized States which reflected the inherent rights of humanity.”16 This held
individuals responsible for crimes against humanity at all times, not just in
connection with war crimes.17 The Einsatzgruppen judgment was the first to convict
defendants of genocide, and consequently it extended international jurisdiction
over that particular crime, although at the time genocide was primarily viewed as
a type of aggravated murder.18 As the Genocide Convention was developed, it
8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17
18

Id. at 424.
See generally NOBUO HAYASHI, THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCES: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2017), http://perma.cc/MK4B-8YFH.
Lippman, supra note 6, at 424.
Id. at 425.
Leora Bilsky & Rachel Klagsbrun, The Return of Cultural Genocide?, 29.2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 373, 378
(2018).
Lippman, supra note 6, at 426, 428.
Id. at 429–30.
See United States v. Ohlendorf, Case No. 9, Trials of War Criminals (Nuremburg Military Trib. IIA, Oct., 1956–Apr., 1948), http://perma.cc/274B-489S; Lippman, supra note 6, at 435.
Lippman, supra note 6, at 436.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438–39.
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built on these principles that the Nuremberg Tribunal applied in these war crimes
cases.

B. The 1948 Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention was adopted in 1948, just after the Nuremburg
Tribunal, influenced by the wreckage of Nazism and the nascent Cold War.19 As
of 2019, 115 states have ratified the Convention. Despite widespread ratification,
the Convention did not prevent genocidal acts from occurring in the twentieth
century, as evidenced in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Convention makes
genocide—a term derived from the Greek “genos,” meaning tribe or ethnicity—
a crime under international law and proscribes certain enumerated acts.20
Genocide is a crime during both peacetime and wartime and states have an
obligation “to prevent and to punish” it.21 Article 2 of the Convention defines the
prohibited as:
any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.22

For each prohibited act, the Convention requires a finding of specific intent.
While the above acts are the only ones explicitly prohibited by the Convention,
Article 3 also establishes liability for acts other than direct genocide, such as
conspiracy, incitement, and attempt. These crimes have been prosecuted in the
Yugoslavian context.23 These prohibitions are intended to protect members of a
group qua group, and not merely individuals who may belong to a protected
group.24
19
20
21
22
23

24

Id. at 452.
Phillip Perlman, The Genocide Convention, 30 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3 (1950).
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1.
Id. at art. 2.
See generally Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016).
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 521 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“[T]he victim
is chosen not because of his individual identity, but rather on account of his membership of a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The victim of the act is therefore a member of a group,
chosen as such, which, hence, means that the victim of the crime of genocide is the group itself and
not only the individual.”).
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The Convention’s enforcement mechanisms vary. Originally, the
Convention permitted states to prosecute the crime of genocide within their own
borders, and no international body exercised subject matter jurisdiction.25 Article
IX allowed the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to determine whether a state
was compliant with the Convention, or even whether a state was responsible for
genocide.26 No sanctions could be imposed, however, unless a state committed
genocide outside of its own territory.27 Scholarship in the latter half of the
twentieth century has argued that, because genocide falls under jus cogens, it is
already subject to universal jurisdiction.28 A jus cogens norm is a principle of
international customary law—that is, it does not necessarily need to be embodied
in a binding instrument to be enforceable—from which there may be no
deviation.29 There is no statute of limitations for genocide after the entry into force
of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in 1970.30
As of 2019, the Convention has a few enforcement mechanisms, the
foremost currently resting in the International Criminal Court (ICC), although the
ICC is not mentioned in the Convention itself. Originally, the Convention
authorized states to prosecute the crime of genocide in national courts or through
a state-to-state mechanism. Article VI of the Convention notes that persons “shall
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed.”31 This mechanism was “unrealistic from the start,” as it is rare that
genocide is “committed without the participation or complicity of the state.”32
Several states, including the U.S. and France, lobbied against universal

25
26
27
28

29

30

31
32

Lippman, supra note 6, at 461.
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 9.
Lippman, supra note 6, at 463.
Id. at 467 (citing Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They’re Not Going to Get Away with It, 11 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 10, 10 n.1 (1989)).
There exists no comprehensive list of jus cogens norms; however, genocide has long been considered
a paradigmatic example of such a norm. For example, in 2019, the International Law Commission
recognized in a draft document that genocide was a binding peremptory norm. See Int’l Law
Comm’n, Chapter V of the Rep. on the Work of the Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at
147 (Aug. 9, 2019).
G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, at art. 1 (Nov. 26, 1968).
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 6.
Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 229, 232 (1995).
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jurisdiction33 over the crime of genocide.34 No extant international tribunal
possessed jurisdiction over state actors when the Convention was drafted,35 but
the ICC has filled the role of an “international penal tribunal,” which was
contemplated in Article VI.36 Article IX of the Convention permits the ICJ to
determine state compliance with the Convention, or, alternatively, to determine
whether a state was responsible for genocide.37 The adoption of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court38 created a permanent international body
vested with the ability to impose meaningful criminal sanctions.39 The U.N. has
temporarily convened tribunals to handle territory-specific matters, consistent
with the language of Article VIII of the Convention.40 The U.N. Security Council,
too, can issue binding decisions.41
Additionally, states have a legal obligation to prevent genocide. This
obligation is in addition to their obligation not to commit genocide and derives
from Article 1 of the Convention, which contains the words “to prevent.”42 An
interpretation of the Convention under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), which requires treaty interpretation be “in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose,”43 reveals that
states must take “reasonable measures” to prevent genocide.44 Furthermore, the
duty to prevent genocide is unique among international duties, because it exists
“irrespective of territory or a specific link to the State in question––each and every
State party to the [Genocide Convention] is addressed and charged with
33

34
35
36
37
38
39

40

41

42
43
44

Universal jurisdiction allows courts to prosecute individuals, regardless of their nationalities or the
location of the act, for crimes against humanity, on the basis that these crimes harm the international
community as a whole. See Rep. of the. Sixth Comm. on Its Sixty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/64/452 (Nov. 13, 2009).
Akhavan, supra note 32, at 233.
Lippman, supra note 6, at 461.
Akhavan, supra note 32, at 235.
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 9.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544.
Björn Schiffbauer, The Duty to Prevent Genocide Under International Law: Naming and Shaming as a Measure
of Prevention, 12.3 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 83 (2018).
See, for example, S.C. Res. 827, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993); see also Akhavan, supra note 32, at 237.
Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly in
the I.C.J., 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 884 (2005).
See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1.
Schiffbauer, supra note 39, at 84–5.
Id. at 85 (citing Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 162 (Feb. 26)).
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prevention.”45 It has been argued by several scholars that the duty to prevent
genocide rises to an erga omnes obligation,46 or an obligation that states owe to the
international community in its entirety, regardless of its ratification of any
international instrument.47

C. The Intent Requirement
Pursuant to the Convention’s text, a finding of genocide requires a finding
of specific intent,48 but tribunals unevenly apply the specific intent requirement.
Some have required direct evidence of specific intent, while others have inferred
it from the totality of the circumstances, focusing on the political and social
context.49 For example, American actions in Vietnam potentially exposed the U.S.
to genocide liability; however, scholars broadly argued that there could not be any
liability without evidence of specific intent. This was in spite of the fact that
“American decision-makers certainly realized that their terror tactics entailed a
substantial likelihood of decimating large numbers of Vietnamese and shattering
civil society” and despite the view that the intent requirement was “contrary to
the traditionally broad conceptualization of the requisite standards of criminal
intent and popular notions of equity and justice.”50
Proving specific intent may be a challenge for Indigenous peoples. In cases
where parties cannot prove specific intent, Indigenous peoples may face
continued violence from those who seek to access and exploit the natural
resources on Indigenous land.51 For example, between 1962 and 1976, Paraguayan
authorities killed 50 percent of the Aché population because they wanted
possession of the Aché’s valuable land.52 International condemnation was swift;

45
46

47

48

49

50
51
52

Id. at 86.
See id.; see also Stephen J. Toope, Does International Law Impose a Duty upon the United Nations to Prevent
Genocide?, 46 MCGILL L. J. 187, 193 (2000).
Ardit Memiti & Bekim Nuhija, The Concept of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, 14 NEW
BALKAN POL. 31 (2013).
Specific intent crimes require “the state to prove that the defendant intended to achieve some
additional consequence.” Eric Johnson, Understanding General and Specific Intent: Eight Things I Know
For Sure, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 525 (2016). In contrast, a general intent offense occurs when
“it is sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant undertook the prohibited conduct voluntarily,
and his purpose in pursuing that conduct is not an element of a crime.” Id. at 530.
Milena Sterio, The Karadzic Genocide Conviction: Inferences, Intent and the Necessity to Redefine Genocide, 31
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 271, 275 (2017).
Lippman, supra note 6, at 480.
Id.
Id. at 481.
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however, no genocide prosecution appeared, perhaps in part due to the fact that
Paraguay claimed that there was no criminal intent to destroy the Aché.53
Nevertheless, there appears to be movement away from a strict specific
intent requirement. In 1992, the Commission of Experts on Yugoslavia issued a
final report addressing the intent requirement, claiming that “[intent] may be
inferred from sufficient facts. In certain cases, there will be evidence of actions or
omissions of such a degree that the defendant may reasonably be assumed to have
been aware of the consequences of his or her conduct.”54
A similar commission established for Rwanda also addressed the intent
requirement. In Rwanda, the Hutu parties claimed that action taken by the Tutsis
was motivated by political animus rather than any racial or ethnic features.55 The
report issued by the Rwandan experts determined that a single, destructive intent
is not required; instead, multiple motives may coexist, so long as one motive is
genocidal in nature.56 The ICJ, too, has noted that “‘attacks on the cultural and
religious property and symbols of the targeted groups’ when conducted in tandem
with ‘physical’ or ‘biological’ attacks, ‘may legitimately be considered as evidence
of an intent to destroy the group.’”57 There is no additional motive requirement.58
The move toward a looser, inferential intent requirement could have important
consequences for marginalized or targeted groups across the globe. Important to
the Indigenous context, too, is the fact that benevolent motives do not excuse the
destruction of a group in whole or in part.59

D. Article 2(b) of the Convention and the Definition of
“Mental Harm”
Article 2(b) of the Convention prohibits causing “serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group.” The Chinese insisted the provision be included,
asserting that the Japanese were distributing opium to “debauch[e]” the minds of

53
54

55
56
57

58
59

Id.
Id. at 489 (citing Final Rep. of the Comm’n of Experts Established Pursuant to S. C. Res. 780, ¶ 97,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994)).
Lippman, supra note 6, at 491.
Id.
Kurt Mundorff, Other Peoples’ Children: A Textual and Contextual Analysis of the Genocide Convention,
Article 2(e), 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 61, 103 (2009) (citing Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007
I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 344 (Feb. 26)).
Mundorff, supra note 57, at 103–04.
See id. at 119–20.
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Chinese citizens.60 The proposal was controversial from the outset.61 The delegate
from the U.K. clarified that the draft text, which included a provision regarding
physical harm, would cover narcotic abuse to the extent of its physical
manifestation.62 An amendment including the mental harm language eventually
passed by a vote of fourteen to ten among the contracting parties.63
While some scholars argue that the legislative history indicates that “mental
harm” was intended to be cabined to narcotics use, no consensus currently exists
on whether that is a correct understanding of the legislative history of Article 2(b).
There is evidence that the Chinese delegates “emphasized the need to create a
Convention of ‘universal scope’ . . . [that] cover[s] harms of the ‘type’ they faced
during World War II.”64
Mental harm, however, goes undefined in the Convention itself, as well as in
treaty law more broadly.65 Article 2(b) also differs from other provisions of the
Convention in that:
the actus reus of serious bodily or mental harm is not a discrete or individual
act . . . [r]ather, it encompasses a category of acts, namely any act causing the
predicate level of harm (‘serious’), including those neither stipulated nor
discussed in the legislative history and those deliberately excluded by the
Convention’s framers.66

The inclusion of both types of harm, mental and physical, indicates that there is
an appreciable difference between the two because “[r]equiring mental harm to
manifest physically would render meaningless its very inclusion since it would be
covered by the protection against bodily harm.”67 The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) applied this approach in the case of

60

61

62
63
64

65
66
67

Stephen Gorove, The Problem of “Mental Harm” in the Genocide Convention, 1951 WASH. U. L. Q. 174,
176 (1951). The Chinese were especially concerned about the distribution of Japanese opium in
China. The Japanese were producing large amounts of opium during this time and had been
distributing it in China in order to weaken or kill the population, according to the Chinese delegates
to the Convention. See id.
The original Chinese amendment read, “impairing the physical integrity or mental capacity of
members of the group,” or “impairing the health of members of the group.” See id. (citing Karim
Azkoul (Rapporteur of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Genocide, 13, 15, U.N. Doc. E/794 (May 24, 1948)).
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
Nema Milaninia, Understanding Serious Bodily or Mental Harm as an Act of Genocide, 51 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1390 (2018) (citing U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 81st mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR.81 (Oct. 22, 1948)).
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1383–84.
Id. at 1393.
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Prosecutor v. Blagojević.68 The tribunal concluded that “individuals who had survived
the mass executions around Srebrenica were subjected to acts causing serious
mental harm,” even though the court made no findings of physical indicators or
symptoms of this harm.69 Therefore, based on the Convention’s text, serious
mental harm does not require any physical manifestation of trauma.
Conflicting jurisprudence exists on the threshold for seriousness as well. The
ICTY70 addressed the threshold question in the case of Prosecutor v. Tolimir,71
holding that serious mental harm is harm that is lasting.72 The ICTY went on to
note that the harm “must go beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or
humiliation and inflict grave and long term disadvantage.”73 Furthermore, the
Tribunal established that the seriousness threshold is determined on a case-bycase basis. Thus, individual acts cannot be always categorized as causing serious
mental harm.74 Despite the individualized determinations, international
jurisprudence provides guideposts for where the threshold for serious harm lies.
Importantly, the ICTY has also applied serious mental harm to situations that did
not involve the survival of a massacre. In Prosecutor v. Krasjišnik, for example, the
Tribunal noted that forcible displacement would qualify as serious mental harm.75
Tribunals apply an objective test for serious mental harm, rather than a
subjective one.76 The tribunals that have encountered mental harm determinations
do not conduct a specific impact analysis, and instead rely on a determination that
harm is likely to be lasting and serious, regardless of the specific evidence
offered.77 The harm need not be “irremediable” to reach the level of seriousness
required by the Convention as interpreted by the ICTY.78 The International Law
Commission, however, has recommended that the word “serious” be interpreted

68

69

70

71

72
73
74
75

76
77
78

Blogojević and Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 17, 2005).
Milaninia, supra note 64, at 1393–94 (citing Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
Judgment, ¶ 647 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 8, 2015).
Although ICTY is not binding on the ICC, the ICC does look to international law in cases where it
lacks its own jurisprudence, including tribunals. See Rome Statute, supra note 38, at art. 21.
Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 8, 2015).
Milaninia, supra note 64, at 1396.
Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A at ¶ 201–02.
Milaninia, supra note 64, at 1396, n. 67–69.
See Prosecutor v. Krasjišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 862 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006); id. at 1395, n. 75.
Milaninia, supra note 64, at 1411.
Id.
Id.
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as “contributing to the destruction” of a group, and that lasting harm, if it does
not so contribute, should not qualify for coverage under the Convention.79
Parties to the Convention have also sought to limit the definition of mental
harm. The U.S., for example, ratified the Convention80 with the understanding
that mental harm should be restricted to the “permanent impairment of mental
faculties through drugs, torture, or similar techniques.”81 This contradicts both the
purpose and intention of the Convention, as well as the plain meaning of the
words “mental harm.” Other countries have criticized the U.S. for the
understanding,82 but its application has not yet been tested in any international
tribunal.83
Consequently, while there is not a universal approach to evaluating serious
mental harm, some tribunals currently apply a threshold determination that does
not require evidence of physical harm, but instead focuses on the lasting nature of
the harm. Furthermore, instead of inquiring into the specific circumstances or
placement of individuals, some tribunals, notably the ICTY, have conducted an
objective inquiry, abstracting away from any certain individual.

III. C ULTURAL G ENOCIDE IS G ENOCIDE U NDER
THE C ONVENTION
This Section analyzes the purpose of the Convention, the plain text of Article
2(b), and the inclusion of Articles 2(d) and 2(e) to argue that cultural genocide is
within the bounds of the Convention. This Section also explores the history of
the term “cultural genocide” and its interaction with, and ultimate exclusion from,
the 1948 Genocide Convention. Cultural genocide, as used in this Comment,
denotes the destruction of “both tangible . . . and intangible . . . structures.”84
Cultural genocide, though, simply indicates a different set of means to achieve the
destruction of the group—means not typically associated with the “crime of
crimes,” such as acts not constituting mass killings or targeted executions.
79
80

81
82

83

84

Id. at 1405.
The U.S. failed to ratify the Convention for forty years. While President Truman ensured that the
U.S. was the first nation to sign the Convention, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Convention
until 1986. See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA. J.
INT’L L. 485, 507–08 (2008).
Lippman, supra note 6, at 483.
See, for example, Paust, supra note 28; see also Maria Frankowska, The U.S. Should Withdraw Its
Reservations to the Genocide Convention: A Response to Professor Paust’s Proposal, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141
(1990).
Although outside of the scope of this Comment, it is possible that the U.S.’s understanding would
be of little importance in an actual prosecution of the Genocide Convention, due to the fact that
the non-commission of genocide is egres omnes.
See Bilsky & Klagsbrun, supra note 12, at 374.

Summer 2020

239

Chicago Journal of International Law

There is a continuing tension between what is referred to as “ethnic
cleansing” and “the crime of genocide.” The ICJ noted in Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro85 that “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using
force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from that area” is not
genocide, but rather a form of “ethnic-cleansing.”86 Genocide can only occur with
the destruction, in whole or in part, of a group. This, however, has interesting
implications for Indigenous populations, whose identities are defined by access
and relationship to ancestral homelands. After the atrocities committed in
Yugoslavia and the lack of resultant genocide convictions, the Commission of
Experts convened thereafter claimed that many of the committed acts should have
been covered by the Convention and “dictated that the Treaty should be liberally
interpreted to encompass existing, as well as evolving methods of genocide.”87
The Commission further noted that genocide may be, but is not necessarily, a
single act, and that collections of actions should be “considered in their entirety
in order to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with
its purpose.”88

A. Legislative History and Drafting
The early drafts of the Convention contemplated cultural genocide as part
and parcel of the enterprise of protecting minority groups from a variety of
potential harms. While the language explicitly prohibiting cultural genocide was
not ultimately included in the Convention, the language was nonetheless drafted
broadly enough for protection against cultural genocide to be included. This is
consistent with the purpose of the Convention.
One of the earliest drafts of the Convention included language prohibiting
destruction of the specific characteristics of a group through:
(a) forcible transfer of children to another human group; or (b) forced and
systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group; or (c)
prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse; or
(d) systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of
religious works or prohibition of new publications; or (e) systematic
destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien
85
86

87
88

Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 190 (Feb. 26).
William A. Schabas, Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of
Crimes, 2.2 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 101, 109 (2007). While the Commission’s
work is not legally binding, it was convened pursuant to a request by the U.N. Security Council, and
spent more than two years studying the Yugoslavian conflict. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter to
the President of the Security Council, 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
Lippman, supra note 6, at 489.
Id. (citing Final Rep. of the Comm’n of Experts Established Pursuant to S.C. Res., supra note 54, at
¶ 94).
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uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic,
or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.89

This language was not ultimately included in the Convention, despite efforts
by Lemkin and the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 96 (I),90 which
identified both culture and physical existence as worthy of protection under
international law.91 The draft provision would have—assuming a straightforward,
textual interpretation, and, further, the will to prosecute—prevented cultural
genocide and enabled the prosecution of cultural erasure of Indigenous peoples.
Another draft provision of the Convention recognized that “genocide inflicts
irreparable loss on humanity by depriving it of the cultural and other contributions
of the group so destroyed.”92
Scholars offer several purported reasons that such a wide-ranging provision
protecting culture was omitted. The first is a relatively dubious claim of
imprecision.93 American President Truman expressed concern that a provision
prohibiting cultural genocide muddies the line between permissible and
impermissible behavior.94 The U.S., however, likely also worried about its own
legal exposure under a cultural genocide provision, especially one that could be
read to prohibit assimilation of minorities into American culture.95 While the
concept of cultural genocide may be broad, it is not inarticulable, as it is articulated
well in the draft texts.
A more plausible explanation may be the perceived imbalance in the severity
of harms.96 Massacres are extremely severe in comparison to many acts that could
be construed as cultural erasure. Further, related explanations suggest that the
contracting parties thought that cultural genocide should be dealt with in human
rights law, or in a separate instrument dedicated solely to cultural genocide.97 In
1985, the addition of cultural genocide to the Genocide Convention was
recommended by the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention and Protection of

89

90

91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Kristina Hon, Comment, Bringing Cultural Genocide in by the Back Door: Victim Participation at the ICC,
43 SETON HALL L. REV. 359, 366 (2013) (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the
Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. E/447 (June 26, 1947)).
“The General Assembly, therefore, affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which
the civilized world condemns . . . whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or
any other grounds . . .” G.A. Res. 96 (I), at 189 (Jan. 31, 1947) (emphasis added).
Lippman, supra note 6, at 457.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 89, at 5.
Hon, supra note 89, at 368.
Brendan V. Fletcher, Indigenous Peoples and the Law, 17 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N Q. 68, 68 (2008).
Id.
Hon, supra note 89, at 368–69.
Id. at 369.
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Minorities, but no progress was made thereafter.98 Neither human rights law nor
any binding separate instrument, though, have produced a body of law relating to
cultural genocide, and cultural genocide remains largely non-prosecutable under
international criminal treaty law as a result.99

B. Textual Interpretation of the Article 2(b)
The text of Article 2(b) of the Convention terms includes acts of cultural
genocide, so long as they result in the destruction, “in whole or in part,” of the
protected group. The Vienna Convention dictates that treaties “be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with their ordinary meaning,” except in cases where
meaning is “ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd
or unreasonable.”100 While critics may point to the legislative and drafting history
of the Convention, the Vienna Convention tends towards textualism. The Vienna
Convention dictates that the interpreter need first start “with the text . . . before
moving from the text, if need be.”101 After looking to the text, an interpreter
should look to the context—structure and other provisions of the piece being
interpreted—and then the object and purpose of the instrument.102
Article 2(b) prohibits “[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group.”103 While Section III.D addresses the meaning(s) of “serious” and
“mental harm,” there is no absurdity in reading Article 2(b) to include the types
of mental harms that cultural genocide produces. The destruction of, and forcible
removal from, a culture is serious under a common-sense understanding of the
word. Mental harm, too, would include a variety of injuries inflicted upon peoples
severed from their cultural moorings.
The text of the Genocide Convention is clear, and the Vienna Convention
therefore supports this interpretation. If the mental harm is serious in nature, the
act is prohibited under the Convention. Furthermore, as noted in Section III.D,
the inclusion of “bodily” and “mental” as separate pieces of Article 2(b) indicates
that the two do not need to be concurrent in order for an act to be prohibited
under the plain meaning of the Article. The inclusion of the word “or” in between,
instead of “and” further supports this proposition. Thus, even looking past the
text itself, the other provisions of the Convention indicate that cultural genocide
is included.

98
99
100
101

102
103

Fletcher, supra note 94, at 69.
Id.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), 32(a)–(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Julian Davis Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History,
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 780, 782 (2013).
Id.
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2(b).
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As indicated by the drafting history of the Convention, the Sixth Committee
vigorously debated the inclusion of cultural genocide. While the Sixth Committee
ultimately excluded explicit provisions dealing with cultural genocide, it
nonetheless drafted Article 2(b) broadly enough to cover some actions of cultural
extermination—only those serious enough to lead to the destruction of the group
in whole or in part. This naturally excludes lesser forms of assimilation that cannot
contribute to the destruction of a group and thus alleviates some concerns about
an overbroad interpretation of cultural genocide.
Furthermore, the inclusion of cultural genocide is by no means absurd. The
Convention was designed to protect peoples qua peoples. Protecting minorities
from majoritarian destruction or domination is consistent with this goal. The
proposition that it is absurd to read the Convention as protecting anything other
than physical destruction is, in fact, contradicted by the text of the Convention
itself.
Even if the ultimate destruction must be physical or biological in nature—
consistent with the intent of the drafters—a textual interpretation still supports
the inclusion of cultural genocide. The destruction or removal of cultural markers
can trigger the long-term nonviability of a cultural group.104 As noted in the Article
2(e) context,105 assimilation or benevolent intentions are no excuse for prohibited
acts. It could further lead to inter-marriage between group members and the
population at large, ultimately resulting in the end of the group “as such.”
Therefore, the end result of cultural genocide is always intended to be physical or
biological in nature. By assimilating group members into the broader population,
the goal is to make them part of the broader population. This leads to physical, as
well as cultural, destruction of a group.

C. Articles 2(d) and 2(e)
Should the Convention’s text be determined to be ambiguous, under the
Vienna Convention, the next interpretive step includes the additional provisions
and articles of the instrument.106 Articles 2(d) and 2(e) of the Convention are
instructive in considering cultural genocide as a prohibited activity. Article 2(e)
prevents the forcible transfer of children from their culture and families to those
outside of the protected group.107 The forcible transfer provisions lurked in the
background of the Convention for nearly fifty years before springing to
104
105
106
107

See id.
See id.
Mortenson, supra note 101, at 782.
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2(e) (“Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.”).
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centerstage in 1997.108 Forcible removal of Indigenous children from their families
occurred in many Western nations, including Australia, the U.S., and Canada, and
did not truly end until the 1970s.109 While the cultural genocide provisions were,
for the most part, not explicitly included within the Convention, Article 2(e) is a
notable exception. A Venezuelan diplomat, influential in the Sixth Committee’s
drafting process, said:
the forced transfer of children to a group where they would be given an
education different from that of their own group, and would have new
customs, a new religion and probably a new language, was in practice
tantamount to the destruction of their group, whose future depended on that
generation of children. . . . [The children] would indeed enjoy an existence
which was materially much better . . . yet if the intent of the transfer were the
destruction of the group, a crime of genocide would undoubtedly have been
committed.110

Article 2(e) encountered little opposition, even from countries who had
residential school programs for Indigenous children.111 Both Australia and the U.S.
thought that residential schools were beneficial to Indigenous peoples, and this
may partially serve as an explanation for why they did not consider their own legal
liability under the Convention.112
Article 2(e), like Article 2(b), contains no exception for benevolent intent—
so long as the requisite intent to destroy is present and a prohibited act took place,
there may be a colorable allegation of genocide.113 The Convention likewise
contains no exception for assimilative projects. Assimilation, on its own, is
unlikely to constitute genocide, and there is some evidence that Lemkin himself
was not entirely opposed to assimilative efforts by colonial countries.114 An
interpretation that included such exceptions and excused the programs of
108
109
110

111

112
113

114

Mundorff, supra note 57, at 63.
Id.
Id. at 83; see also id. at 111 n.284 (“[W]hile opposed in principle to the inclusion of cultural genocide,
the U.S. delegation ‘had nevertheless made an exception in the special case of the forced transfer
of children.’”).
Id. at 111.
It is curious that several parties involved in drafting the Genocide Convention
clearly understood forcible child transfers to be genocidal, but apparently failed
to realize that their own longstanding practices might violate Article 2(e). For
instance, the U.S., which rallied parties against the cultural genocide provisions,
lobbied for including forcible child transfers without seeming to realize that this
provision might implicate its American Indian residential school program.
Id. at 119–20.
The jurisprudence of the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda indicate that
the scope of the Convention may extend beyond the bounds of the five prohibited acts. See Section
IV.C.
Mundorff, supra note 57, at 122.
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Australia, the U.S., and Canada, however, would be inconsistent with the Vienna
Convention’s dictates.115 The programs in these nations relied on forcible transfer
of groups, with the intention to “[k]ill the Indian, save the man.”116 Sir Paul
Hasluck, the engineer of the residential school program, clearly stated that “tribal
culture will be destroyed.”117 Recently, Canada issued an apology and accepted
responsibility for its genocide of First Nations peoples through its operation of its
residential school program.118
Article 2(e) concerns culture, and this interpretation is supported by the
inclusion of Article 2(d) in the Convention. Article 2(d) prohibits “[i]mposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group.”119 Preventing births within
a group indicates that physical destruction through forced sterilization, or halting
the continuation of a racial or ethnic bloodline through other means, is indeed an
act of genocide. Article 2(e), however, prevents the taking of children from their
families after birth. If the Convention were solely concerned with matters of
physical destruction, Article 2(e) would be superfluous, and Article 2(d) would
cover the physical destruction of a group. Article 2(e), thus, can only be about
culture.
Furthermore, Article 2(e) contains no provision prohibiting the killing of
children after removal, because this act is prohibited under Article 2(a).120
Therefore, physical killing of children and population nonviability through lack of
births are both already included within the Convention. Article 2(e), then, must
be about preventing the wholesale destruction of a group, not by physically
destroying the group, but by preventing the transmission of cultural knowledge
between generations. Forcible transfer prohibits placing group members outside
of their groups in order to prevent them from obtaining and perpetuating cultural
markers, and to assimilate them into the dominant society, rendering them at least
culturally indistinguishable from the majority population at large. The inclusion of
Article 2(e) was a deliberate drafting choice, and therefore, the drafting
committees understood that cultural genocide would be—at least in some form—
impermissible under international law.

115
116
117
118

119
120

Id. at 124.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 124.
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued an apology in 2008 to survivors of the residential
schooling systems. See Government apologizes for residential schools in 2008, CBC ARCHIVES (June 25,
2018), http://perma.cc/UW7U-V35H. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau apologized again
in 2018 in response to allegations that Prime Minister Harper’s apology was not robust enough. See
Catherine McIntyre, Read Justin Trudeau’s apology to residential school survivors in Newfoundland,
MACLEANS (Nov. 24, 2017), http://perma.cc/5RAK-ZRZ3.
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2(d).
See id. at art. 2(a).
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Under the American legal canon of interpretation expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, critics may argue that the inclusion of Article 2(e) only serves to bolster
the claim that cultural genocide was meant to be outside the bounds of Article
2(b). This, however, is inconsistent with the reading dictated by the Vienna
Convention. The plain meaning of each clause indicates that cultural genocide is
included within both Article 2(b) and Article 2(e). The meanings of the two
clauses, taken together, produce no absurdity. They indicate that destruction of
cultural markers to the point where the group ceases to exist may be sufficient to
sustain a colorable allegation of genocide.

D. Intent and Purpose
The Vienna Convention also dictates that the intent and purpose of the
instrument are relevant to interpretation. The U.N. adopted the Genocide
Convention against the backdrop of a burgeoning movement towards selfdetermination of peoples, as well as the horrors committed against the Jews and
other racial, ethnic, and religious minorities during the Holocaust. It purportedly
showed real dedication to the protection of peoples from destruction, and to
“liberate mankind from . . . an odious scourge.”121 It is undeniable that one
purpose of the Convention is to prevent extermination by killing; however, the
text and the legislative history of the Convention indicate that it is designed to
protect minority groups from far more than killing. Further, given the
establishment of the ICC and international prosecution of the crime of genocide,
the Convention should stop states from committing such atrocities against their
populations. The Convention itself identifies a positive duty to prevent the crime
of genocide, and states party, by failing to prevent the taking of Indigenous land,
would be contravening their positive obligation of prevention under the text and
purpose of the Convention.122
Tribunals can, and should, utilize the Convention to proscribe acts of
cultural genocide as paths to true, genocidal destruction, and can ground their
decisions as consistent with the intent and purpose of the Convention. In
Blagojević, the Trial Chamber found that forcible deportations amounted to
genocide because “the physical or biological destruction of a group is not
necessarily the death of the group members.”123 In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber
also acknowledged that “rape . . . achieves genocidal results through cultural
processes” and that cultural factors play a “crucial role” in maintaining cultural

121
122
123

Id. at pmbl.
See generally Schiffbauer, supra note 39.
Mundorff, supra note 57, at 114 (citing Blogojević and Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60, Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005)).
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structures that ensure long-term viability of a vulnerable group.124 In both cases,
the tribunals could have cabined genocide to the specifically prohibited acts in
Article 2,125 but instead expanded prohibited acts to include forcible deportation
and rape insofar as they constitute genocide due to cultural impacts.
While tribunals may not opt to consider cultural genocide as a crime in itself
under the Genocide Convention, cultural genocide still has an important
probative function in proving the specific intent of actors. In cases where cultural
destruction has occurred alongside one of the enumerated prohibited acts, the
targeted destruction of cultural markers may evidence intent to destroy a group.
Kurt Mundorff notes that cultural destruction, even through the lens of coercive
or forced assimilation, “centers on hostility to the targeted group’s continued
existence as a ‘separate and distinct entity . . .’ [and] seeks to eliminate the group’s
distinctive characteristics as the group is absorbed into another group.”126 If this
hostility manifests in cultural destruction––for example, refusing to permit a
group to speak their language, or destroying sacred spaces––and is conducted in
connection with a larger effort comprised of a prohibited act, an inference of
specific intent may be easily made.

E. The Doctrine of Continuing Violations
Generally, acts that contravene an international convention, but were
committed before the passage of the instrument, are non-prosecutable.127 This is
consistent with the Vienna Convention:
Unless a different intention appears from a treaty or is otherwise established,
its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took
place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of entry into force
of the treaty with respect to that party.128
124
125

126
127

128

Id. at 115 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 521 (Sept. 2, 1998).
The prohibited acts are as follows:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2.
Mundorff, supra note 57, at 124.
See generally Loukis G. Loucaides, The Concept of “Continuing” Violations of Human Rights in THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED ESSAYS (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
2007).
William A. Schabas, Retroactive Application of the Genocide Convention, 4 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 36, 38 (2010).
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The Genocide Convention contains no intention of retroactivity, and thus
seems to only apply to actions taken after 1951.129 This may not completely
preclude prosecution of genocide committed before 1951, though, due to the
obligation to investigate and punish genocide, as well as the traditional assumption
that “atrocity crime” treaties do possess retroactive force.130 This is due in part to
the idea that the prohibition on genocide is an international jus cogens norm, and
therefore needs no binding instrument to be considered prohibited at all times.131
Furthermore, at the Convention’s conception, there were three international
treaties dealing with atrocity crimes with, at a minimum, “implicit retroactive
application”: the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal.132
There is another path towards prosecution of acts that occurred before the
passage of the 1948 Convention, though, and it begins with the doctrine of
continuous or continuing violations. The doctrine of continuous violations was
created in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 1970s as the InterAmerican Court was dealing with missing persons cases, and has been further
recognized by working groups at the U.N.133 The Court held that it could exert
jurisdiction over these missing person claims
even if th[e] act had begun before its ratione temporis jurisdiction came into
effect. The reasoning is that a disappearance could be described as a
continuing violation up to the time when the circumstances of the
disappeared person were discovered . . . . The rationale lies in the idea that
the defendant state in such cases is responsible for a failure to discharge its
obligation[s] . . . a failure that is an autonomous and on-going breach of its

129
130

131
132
133

See id. at 38–39.
See id. at 41; see also id. at 41–42 for a discussion of other treaties prohibiting “atrocity crimes” which
have applied retroactively.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.
Frédéric Mégret, The Notion of ‘Continuous Violations,’ Expropriated Armenian Properties, and the European
Court of Human Rights, 14 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 317, 319 (2014); see also U.N.H.R. Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, General Comment on Enforced Disappearances as a Contiguous
Crime, ¶ 39 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/48, (Jan. 26, 2011)
Thus, when an enforced disappearance began before the entry into force of an
instrument or before the specific State accepted the jurisdiction of the
competent body, the fact that the disappearance continues after the entry into
force . . . gives the institution the competence and jurisdiction to consider the
act . . . as a whole, and not only acts or omissions imputable to the State that
followed the entry into force of the relevant legal instrument . . . .
Id. The same working group also recognized that reservations preventing the application of the
doctrine of continuous violations should be “interpreted so as not to create an obstacle” to liability.
Id.
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human rights obligations, regardless of the timing of the triggering
occurrence.134

Important to the analysis of whether an international crime is amenable to
the application of the doctrine of continuous violations is whether the triggering
event has produced long-lasting and continuing, adverse effects.135 The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has been especially aggressive in utilizing the
continuing violations doctrine but has recognized that not all violations of
international law are continuous in nature. For example, in Alfonso Martín del
Campo-Dodd v. Mexico, the Court determined that torture is not a continuous
violation, because “[e]ach act of torture is consummated or terminated within
itself.”136 Jeffrey Hall has noted that, for the Inter-American Court, “the decisive
issue . . . is whether the state stands in an ongoing relationship with the [victim]
such that if the state changed its behavior, the violation would effectively cease.”137
The Inter-American Court often hears land rights cases, and it generally
reaches outcomes favoring Indigenous groups. While the American Convention
on Human Rights138 is the applicable instrument for most of these cases, the
Court’s jurisprudence still points towards a strengthening of Indigenous rights—
one that it could use in applying the Genocide Convention.
In Moiwana Community v. Suriname,139 the Court embraced communal rights to
property.140 The Court noted that the N’djuka people had an “all-encompassing
relationship to their communal lands . . . their traditional occupancy . . . should
suffice to obtain [s]tate recognition of their ownership.”141 In Sawhoyamaxa, the

134

135
136
137
138

139

140

141

Id. at 318–19. In the foundational case explaining the continuing violations doctrine, Blake v.
Guatemala, the court recognized that the murder of an American journalist, committed by the
Guatemalan military, occurred before the court had proper temporal jurisdiction. Due to
“subsequent acts [which implied] complicity in, and concealment of, Mr. Blake’s arrest and murder,”
that occurred after Guatemala acceded to the court’s jurisdiction, the Court asserted jurisdiction
over the murder itself. See Jeffrey B. Hall, Just a Matter of Time? Expanding the Temporal Jurisdiction of
the Inter-American Court to Address Cold War Wrongs, 14(4) LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 679, 685 (2008).
Mégret, supra note 133, at 319.
Hall, supra note 134, at 687.
Id. at 687–88.
Specifically, Article 21 of the American Convention is applied to property claims. Article 21
establishes the right to property, including “the right to the use and enjoyment,” and property may
not be appropriated by the government without just compensation. See American Convention on
Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
Moiwana Comm. v. Surin, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 124
(June 15, 2005).
Tom Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Court, 35 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 113, 145 (2013).
Id. at 145 (citing Moiwana, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 124); see also Xákmok Kásek Indigenous
Comm. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C)., No.
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Inter-American Court recognized that “traditional possession . . . has equivalent
effects to those of state-granted full property title.”142 This same case established
that “the community maintains a right to (re)claim its territory” if the land has
cultural importance and a “cultural injury” has occurred.143 Lastly, in Sarayaku, the
Court established the right to cultural identity as a “fundamental right . . . [that]
should be respected in a multicultural, pluralistic and democratic society.”144
The doctrine of continuing violations was further extended in Moiwana. In
Moiwana, the Court held Suriname liable for the killing and forced displacement
of a Maroon tribe, even though the displacement occurred a year before Suriname
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.145 The lands taken from the Moiwana
Community were considered their ancestral homelands, although the tribe was
originally comprised of the descendants of runaway slaves.146 In the decision, the
Court recognized that dispossession of Indigenous lands “deprive[s] the group of
one of the fundamental elements of [the group’s] identity”147 and that Indigenous
groups’ survival
depends upon their right to their lands, this right may be said to arise directly
from their status as [I]ndigenous or tribal people. Such status is without
temporal limitation; it can be neither created nor destroyed by the state. As a
result, the violation of rights inherent to that status may be deemed to arise
continuously.148

Suriname, despite knowledge of the events, failed to bring the perpetrators of the
displacement and violence to justice.149
To exercise jurisdiction in Moiwana, the Court recognized that failure to
investigate or provide effective recourse for human rights violations, even prior to
the ratification of a treaty, is its own form of continuing violation.150 While the
actual killing of Moiwana community members was outside the jurisdiction of the
Court because Suriname did not accede to its jurisdiction until after the massacre,
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214, ¶ 281 (Aug. 24, 2010) (stating that land is “fundamental and unbreakable for [the community’s]
human and cultural survival . . . [and] is not just any piece of real estate”).
Id. at 148 (quoting Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 146, ¶ 120 (Mar. 29, 2009)).
Id. at 149.
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C), No. 245, ¶ 217 (Jun. 27, 2012).
Hall, supra note 134, at 688.
Id. at 689.
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Tom Antkowiak, Moiwana Village v. Suriname: A Portal into Recent Jurisprudential Developments of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 268, 272–73 (2007).
Hall, supra note 134, at 691.
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the Court exercised jurisdiction over “the State’s fulfillment of its obligation to
investigate those occurrences” from Suriname’s ratification of the American
Convention onwards.151 The Court “essentially held that a State is obligated to
investigate and prosecute all violations of human rights, even if that violation
happened before the ratification of the Convention.”152 The idea motivating the
doctrine is “failure to investigate a past violation . . . [is] an ongoing failure [that]
violates victims’ Convention-protected right to judicial protection.”153
The doctrine of continuing violations presents a potential pathway forward
for prosecution of land takings, whether accompanied by physical violence or not.
The doctrine could straightforwardly be applied in the Article 2(e) context against
the U.S., Australia, and Canada, which operated mandatory residential school
systems both before and after the ratification of the Genocide Convention.
The Genocide Convention, while differing from the American Convention
in many respects, seems to contain a “positive obligation to investigate and
prosecute genocide” and “State practice probably confirms such an interpretation
of the Convention.”154 Coupled with a reading of the Convention under the
Vienna standards, it, too, could be applied to Indigenous land takings. This would
enable tribunals to reach back to the date of ratification, or even before, to provide
potential redress for victims. The remedy for these procedural violations may
differ by tribunal but would nonetheless bring attention to the actions being
committed.155

IV. I NDIGENOUS L AND T AKINGS A RE A CTIONABLE
A S G ENOCIDE
Increased international attention on Indigenous issues is pressuring
countries to reform their Indigenous policies. As of 2019, though, Indigenous land
rights are still not adequately prioritized and protected. One of the primary reasons
for this is the inadequacy of current enforcement mechanisms. This Section will
begin with a discussion of current enforcement mechanisms’ failures and will
provide examples of contemporary land takings. This Section will then argue that,
because cultural genocide is––and should be––a legally cognizable harm,
Indigenous peoples may have a claim under the Genocide Convention.
151
152

153
154
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Antkowiak, supra note 149, at 278.
Pablo A. Ormachea, Moiwana Village: The Inter-American Court and the Continuing Violation Doctrine, 19
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 283, 284 (2006).
Id. at 285.
Schabas, supra note 128, at 41 (“A large number of States have incorporated the crime of genocide
within their own national legislation, often giving their legislation retroactive effect. Yet it does not
seem to be State practice to limit this retroactive effect to events subsequent to entry into force of
the Convention.”).
See generally Antkowiak, supra note 149.
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Indigenous peoples stand to benefit immensely from this type of enforcement
mechanism. Lastly, through the doctrine of continuing violations, this Section will
argue that Indigenous peoples are entitled to redress for harms committed both
before and after a state’s ratification of the Convention. This Section is primarily
intended to provide information to ground a potential solution, rather than to
argue that each of these takings could meet all of the requirements of the
Genocide Convention.

A. Defining Indigeneity
Indigeneity has been difficult to define due to the variance across the world’s
370 million Indigenous people.156 These variances produce an inability to collapse
all Indigenous groups into one cohesive mass for definitional purposes under
international law. One widely used definition of Indigenous peoples is the one put
forth by U.N. Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo in a report on discrimination
against Indigenous peoples:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors
of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They
form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories,
and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples,
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal
systems.157

The defining feature of Indigeneity is a group’s presence in a region “before
[other] settlers moved in as a result of conquest, occupation, colonization, etc.”158
Other important determinative factors for Indigeneity are whether the group
considers itself “different from other groups, whether it shares a common
ancestry with the occupants of a given territory prior to its conquest by another
group or series of groups, whether it tends to reside in a particular geographic
area, and whether it shares a language, culture, and history.”159 The Cobo
definition of Indigenous peoples reflects the experience of peoples in North and
South America, Russia, and the Arctic, where colonial powers displaced and
156
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158
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U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Indigenous Peoples and UNESCO, U.N.
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (2017), http://perma.cc/2XE3A9DN.
José Martinez Cobo (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities), Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Population, Chapter
XXII: Proposals and Recommendations, ¶ 379, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (1986).
Hannibal Travis, The Cultural and Intellectual Property Interests of the Indigenous Peoples of Turkey and Iraq,
15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 415, 423 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
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dominated Indigenous peoples.160 The experiences of Indigenous groups in Asia
and Africa, though, differ in kind due to the absence of “large-scale Western settler
colonialism.”161 Consequently, while there can be no single, referential definition
of Indigeneity, the factors outlined above provide a framework for evaluating
whether a group is Indigenous.

B. Shrinking Indigenous Land Holdings
Indigenous peoples have faced the taking of their lands throughout history,
largely due to colonialism and increased settlement in previously remote areas.
The problem, unfortunately, has not abated in the modern era. Costa Rica
provided a modern account of this process in correspondence with Cobo, the
Special Rapporteur:
At present indigenous persons are facing their greatest problems as a result
of the invasion of lands which they traditionally regarded as their own. . . .
[T]hey feel harassed and at a disadvantage in the presence of “nonindigenous” persons; this causes them so many problems that they migrate to
other, more remote areas . . . which, in point of fact, are ceasing to be
[remote] due to the rapid development the country is undergoing.162

This story has been repeated across history and continues to take place today.163
Despite centuries of existential threats, Indigenous issues did not begin to
garner international attention at the U.N. until the late twentieth century.164 Prior
to U.N. involvement, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) recognized the
importance of studying and affirming Indigenous rights as workers’ rights.165 In
1957, the ILO adopted the first international convention targeting Indigenous
populations: the Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent
Countries, Convention No. 107.166 Convention No. 107 was ratified by twenty-
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Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, at 6,
U.N. Doc ST/ESA/328 (Sept. 8, 2009) [hereinafter SOWIP].
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José Martinez Cobo (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities), Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Chapter
XVII: Land, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. E./CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.4 (1983).
See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47 (2012) (Indigenous land
rights are “entirely unprotected.”).
SOWIP, supra note 160, at 2.
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and advocate for fair labor. See ILO, Development Cooperation, http://perma.cc/SEV5-JD27.
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seven states and required the compilation of yearly reports on the status of
Indigenous populations within states’ borders.167 ILO No. 107 was state-centric,
and solicited little input from the Indigenous peoples who supposedly were
benefitting from the provisions.168 Critically, ILO No. 107 contained exceptions
to the prohibition on removing Indigenous peoples from their lands.169
These exceptions to the removal prohibition, found within Article 12 of ILO
No. 107, apply in situations implicating “interests of national security, national
economic development or indigenous health.”170 Unfortunately, these exceptions
are three of the oft-cited reasons for Indigenous groups’ removal from their
territories.171 Consequently, ILO No. 107 is not a sufficiently strong enforcement
mechanism against land takings.
In 1989, the ILO adopted Convention No. 169, the Convention concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.172 The ILO almost
entirely excluded Indigenous peoples from the drafting process, and the
Convention has not been frequently used by Indigenous peoples as a result.173 This
is despite Convention No. 169’s strong land protections, regarded as the strongest
land rights protections of any existing Indigenous rights instrument.174 Article 14
of ILO No. 169 requires states to recognize “the rights of ownership and
possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally
occupy.”175 The inclusion of the word possession, though, has produced ambiguity
and permitted governments to recognize limited Indigenous title—occupancy
title, for example, as has been recognized historically in the U.S.176 —rather than
full title in fee simple.
In 2007, Indigenous peoples made what appeared to be an international
breakthrough. The U.N. voiced full-throated support for the rights of Indigenous
peoples with the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).177 The UNDRIP contains provisions protecting
167
168
169
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Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 51.
Int’l Labour Org. (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Population Convention (No. 107), at art. 12 (1957)
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XANTHAKI, supra note 166, at 63.
Convention No. 107, supra note 169, at art. 12.
See generally ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169) (1989).
XANTHAKI, supra note 166, at 68, 81.
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Id. at 82.
See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831),
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); see also Tee-Hit-Ton v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
See generally Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 2.
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Indigenous peoples against the taking of their land. Specifically, Article 8(2)(b)
directs states to provide effective enforcement mechanisms for “[a]ny action
which has the aim or effect of dispossessing [Indigenous peoples] of their lands,
territories or resources”; Article 10 prohibits forcible removal from territories
without “free, prior and informed consent” of the groups; and Article 26
recognizes that “Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or
acquired,” as well as the right to “own, use, develop and control” these lands.178
Despite receiving 144 votes in favor, the win was tainted by the failure of four
nations—the U.S., New Zealand, Australia, and Canada—to vote in favor of the
UNDRIP.179 A partial explanation for these states’ rejection of the UNDRIP is
found in title holding structures. The U.S. operates a reservation system, in which
the federal government holds land in trust for Indigenous peoples. A recognition
that Indigenous peoples hold more than mere occupancy title would effectively
destroy this system.180 Moreover, the U.S. rejected “any possibility that this
document is or can become international customary law.”181 Finally, the UNDRIP,
much like similar international declarations, does not have an international
enforcement mechanism to enforce Indigenous land sovereignty and sanction
those who would infringe upon it.
While the UNDRIP lacks a firm enforcement mechanism, international
courts may look to the document as a proxy for general principles regarding
Indigenous rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has occasionally
quoted the UNDRIP, although it has not totally followed its mandates on
Indigenous rights, such as in the case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua., discussed in
Section II.C of this Comment.182 Relatedly, the Inter-American Court has issued
binding judgments prohibiting resource extraction in Indigenous homelands, and
is the only international tribunal to have done so.183 The Court’s decision does not
rely on the UNDRIP.184 The lack of courts’ reliance on the UNDRIP should not
diminish the importance of the instrument as an international recognition of
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Id. at 10–11, 19.
Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1142 (2008).
See XANTHAKI, supra note 166, at 83.
S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards
Re-empowerment, JURIST (Oct. 3, 2007), http://perma.cc/6MXH-UXCU.
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Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS.
INT’L L. J. 51, 54 (2009).
Antkowiak, supra note 140, at 120.
See id at 133, 144–45.
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Indigenous rights. International recognition through the UNDRIP, though, has
been largely ineffective in stopping land takings.

C. Contemporary Issues in Indigenous Land Taking
Despite growing international pressure for reform, land disputes remain
prevalent across the globe, especially in resource-rich areas like the U.S. and
Canada. And while the Inter-American Court of Human Rights may prove helpful
to groups in the Americas, its reliance on the American Convention on Human
Rights prevents it from being a worldwide enforcement mechanism.185 Executive
orders and decisions by the Inter-American Court may be advantageous in some
instances, but have, for the most part, failed to stop these takings. Consequently,
Indigenous groups need to look elsewhere to find effective and universal
enforcement of their land rights. This subsection will address several recent land
disputes involving nuclear waste, pipelines, and resource extraction.
The U.S. has long struggled with where to store nuclear waste, and in the
early 2000s, decided to utilize a repository at Yucca Mountain, located in
Nevada.186 In 2002, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) condemned U.S. action towards the Western Shoshone
Nation, whose territory largely overlaps with the American state of Nevada.187
Despite international condemnation, including an adverse report from the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights in 2002,188 the U.S. pushed forward with
occupancy extinguishment for Yucca Mountain, its status as a sacred area for the
Western Shoshone Nation notwithstanding.189 In 2016, President Obama used a
novel approach to protecting Indigenous land by declaring an area in Utah—
sacred to the Navajo, Zuni, Hopi, Ute Indian, and Ute Mountain Ute tribes—a
national monument, after receiving significant input from the tribes themselves.190
While this solution worked temporarily, President Trump reversed much of
Obama’s efforts by shrinking the monument by eighty-five percent; litigation is
ongoing as of December 2019.191 Even if President Trump’s actions are found
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impermissible, the monument does not compensate the tribes for the fact that the
original land was taken from the tribes.
Pipelines in the U.S. and Canada, too, have sparked recent controversy due
to adverse impacts on Indigenous homelands. The Dakota Access Pipeline,
intended to transport up to 570,000 barrels of crude oil per day from North
Dakota to Illinois, was vehemently protested by the Standing Rock Sioux tribe.192
The pipeline runs directly underneath the primary water source for the tribe and
traverses a sacred burial ground, but does not touch formal reservation land.193
Federal U.S. policy dictates that disputes of this nature be resolved through
consultation with the tribes. Executive Order 13175 identifies some guidelines for
tribal consultation before implementing federal plans; however, it created no
substantive rights, no cause of action, and no uniform process for this
consultation.194 Executive Order 13007 likewise establishes that administrative
agencies must “avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of . . . sacred
sites.”195 The Standing Rock Sioux, along with environmental nonprofit groups,
unsuccessfully pursued litigation to stop the project.196 President Trump ultimately
approved the final permit for the project—a permit which President Obama had
previously denied under intense pressure from environmental and Indigenous
advocates—and the pipeline became operational in 2017.197
Similarly, the Keystone XL pipeline, which crosses the border between the
U.S. and Canada, has come under fire from Indigenous groups. President Obama
also withheld a permit for Keystone XL, only to be reversed by President Trump,
again.198 In 2017, representatives from the Indigenous Environmental Network
announced that they would continue to camp along the proposed route of the
pipeline in order to “assert [their] rights . . . to [their] water, [their] bodies, and
[their] land.”199 Keystone, too, would not formally cross reservation land, leaving
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Indigenous peoples without formal property rights to contest the pipeline.200
Although avoiding reservation land, the pipeline still crosses culturally critical
land. Nick Tilsen, a citizen of the Oglala Sioux Nation, notes that “[o]ur territory
as Lakota, Dakota and Nakota people today is not defined by the colonial
boundaries that have been created around us, but rather, where our people have
existed in harmony with Mother Earth for generations.”201 The Trump
administration continues to push ahead with these projects despite the public
backlash and well-founded concerns of the Sioux.202
The U.S. is far from the only offender. In 1998, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights filed a complaint against Nicaragua for issuing logging permits
inside the bounds of land belonging to the Awas Tingni people.203 Logging and
the destruction of Indigenous lands continues to be a live issue in South America.
For example, wildfires are the latest flashpoint in a contentious relationship
between Indigenous peoples and South American governments. In 2019, 75,000
wildfires demolished significant portions of the Amazonian rainforest, primarily
in Brazil but also throughout South America more broadly.204 In 2019, the
Waorani people, who inhabit remote portions of the Ecuadorian Amazon,
brought a case alleging that they were not adequately consulted and had not
consented to the Ecuadorian government’s plans to auction their land for oil and
resource development.205 A three-judge panel ruled in the Waorani’s favor and
prohibited the Ecuadorian government from auctioning the land.206 Prior to the
lawsuit, the Waorani and other Indigenous groups experienced threats and acts of
violence by logging and oil proponents, who have an interest in the resource-rich
territories. Similar lawsuits have also succeeded in Brazil, where a transfer of
Indigenous land from the National Indigenous Affairs Agency to the agricultural
agency was blocked.207
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Some activists on Twitter call the Amazonian wildfires, and Brazil’s failure
to prevent them or take appropriate remedial steps, an act of genocide against
Brazil’s Indigenous populations. A representative from the Baré Nation, from
northwest Brazil, claims that the Brazilian government’s support for increased
mining and agricultural presences, including these groups’ illegal logging activities,
has resulted in both deforestation and violent attacks against, and forcible removal
of, Indigenous populations.208 In an open letter to the U.N., Indigenous groups in
Bolivia and Brazil identified the ongoing wildfires as “physical and cultural
genocide.”209 There has been documented deforestation on Indigenous lands in
2019, and there are allegations that many of the fires were set deliberately.210
As the above examples demonstrate, governments still are unable, or
unwilling, to vindicate or respect the land rights, and the current remedies are
insufficient. While the existing framework has failed to protect Indigenous
peoples, the Genocide Convention may provide a path forward.

D. Land Takings as Cultural Erasure
While it is difficult to generalize across all Indigenous groups, most
Indigenous peoples’ cultural identities are deeply entwined with their relationship
to their ancestral lands, as has been confirmed by numerous scholars and various
international bodies.211 Consequently, honoring Indigenous land rights is a critical
step towards cultural preservation.212 For example, as one Indigenous land rights
group in Australia noted, noted “[t]he land is the basis for the creation stories, for
religion, spirituality, art and culture . . . [and] for relationships between people and
with earlier and future generations. . . . The loss of land, or damage to land, can
cause immense hardship to indigenous peoples.”213 ILO No. 169 recognizes the
important spiritual and cultural relationship between Indigenous peoples and their
homelands, as well as the resulting responsibility that Indigenous peoples feel for
these lands.214 James Anaya, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples from 2008 to 2011, likewise stated that Indigenous peoples’ “ancestral
208
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roots are embedded in the lands in which they live” or “in which they have
lived.”215 The Inter-American Court, too, recognized that Indigenous land is
essential to the “social, ancestral and spiritual essence” of these peoples, and
further recognized that protecting these lands is important to cultural
preservation.216 Ancestral homelands provide critical infrastructure for
transmission of Indigenous cultural knowledge from one generation to the next.
The destruction of these lands, or the removal of groups from these traditional
homelands, greatly inhibits the ability of Indigenous groups to preserve their
cultures. Safeguarding Indigenous land is therefore equivalent to safeguarding
Indigenous culture.

E. Indigenous Land Taking as a Potential Continuing Violation
There is a jus cogens norm to not commit—and further, to prevent—the
international crime of genocide. The Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence
provides a good starting point for this type of analysis. While many genocidal acts
against Indigenous peoples were committed prior to the 1948 adoption of the
Genocide Convention, the prevailing view is that these actions were nonprosecutable under the reading of the Convention required by the Vienna
Convention. While the Vienna Convention’s tendency towards textualism has
been discussed, there is another method to prosecute takings dating back to the
1948 Convention. This is important because many Indigenous groups have
already suffered cultural severance from their lands due to past takings.217 An
extension of the doctrine of continuing violations, though, would put many of
these takings inside the jurisdiction of international tribunals.
As discussed earlier, violations of Article 2(e) based on residential school
programs would be prosecutable in the U.S., if not in Canada and Australia, as
well. While both Canada and Australia have at least begun the process of
reckoning with their past usage of residential schools,218 none of these nations
have engaged in any sort of systematic investigation and prosecution of those
responsible for the residential school system. All of these nations, too, signed and
ratified the Genocide Convention.219 Therefore, following the framework that the
215
216
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Inter-American Court laid out in Moiwana, these violations would fall within the
jurisdictional bounds of tribunals due to their continuing nature.
The same framework could be applied to Indigenous land takings, just as it
was in Moiwana. Takings accompanied by physical violence—like the one at issue
in Moiwana itself—could also be covered. These events would be prosecutable
under the Genocide Convention even in the absence of a reading that includes
cultural genocide within its terms. The ICJ has noted that violations of land rights,
when in combination with a prohibited act, are relevant to determinations of
genocide. Therefore, acts that are both physical and cultural—like the Paraguayan
massacre of the Aché people, conducted in order to take their land and exploit
it—would be prosecutable even if the acts occurred prior to the ratification date
of the Genocide Convention. The Aché massacre occurred in the 1950s and 60s,
before Paraguay ratified the Genocide Convention in 2001.220
Furthermore, to the extent that current land issues are related to ongoing
failures to investigate or prosecute past genocidal actions—such as those
implicated by residential schools—they, too, may be prosecutable under the
doctrine of continuing violations. Application of the doctrine could render the
ongoing issues in the Amazon, some of which allegedly involve violence, open to
prosecution; likewise with pipeline disputes. Jurisdiction could possibly reach back
as far as the original taking of the land from Indigenous populations.
Consequently, any killing or forced removal or displacement could allow
prosecutors to seek derivative recourse for Indigenous populations’ land, while
dissuading these types of takings and encouraging states to investigate and
prosecute past harms to the extent possible.

V. C ONCLUSION
This Comment proposes a textualist understanding of the Genocide
Convention such that acts of cultural genocide are prosecutable under
international law. This Comment endeavored to display the potential upsides of
such an approach—protection of Indigenous land under the Convention’s own
terms.
The Genocide Convention is intended to protect minority groups who do
not have the political clout or population size to protect themselves from
destruction by a majoritarian group. Indigenous peoples have suffered immensely
throughout history, from the colonial period’s near-total destruction of
Indigenous populations through disease and war, to the twentieth-century
phenomenon of residential schooling programs, to current efforts to take and
exploit historically Indigenous lands. Indigenous groups, despite winning recent
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victories with the UNDRIP, have little international redress when their rights are
violated by majority groups. Using the Genocide Convention to prohibit land
takings as a form of included cultural genocide, potentially through the doctrine
of continuing violations, could provide the redress these populations deserve.
Furthermore, the application of the Genocide Convention to an act of
cultural genocide would send a strong signal to all nations that destructive acts will
no longer be tolerated by the international community. If Article 2(e) of the
Convention had been utilized earlier in residential schooling programs’ history,
many Indigenous children would not have had their entire worldviews stripped
away and erased. The inclusion of cultural genocide would signify concrete
progress towards the recognition of minority rights and would be more than the
lip-service these rights often receive. It is true that there are continuing acts of
physical genocide across the globe, from Sudan to Myanmar. These acts, too,
should be vigorously opposed and prosecuted by all signatories to the Genocide
Convention. Including cultural genocide within the Convention would not take
away or diminish the seriousness of these horrific crimes, but instead would
provide an additional layer of protection, consistent with the text and the context
of the Convention itself, to minority groups across the globe.
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